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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1990), as this case 
was transferred from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals 
under Rule 42, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(2)(b) (1988) provides: 
"Independent contractor" means any person 
engaged in the performance of any work for 
another who, while so engaged, is 
independent of the employer in all that 
pertains to the execution of the work, is not 
subject to the rule or control of the 
employer, is engaged only in the performance 
of a definite job or piece of work, and is 
subordinate to the employer only in 
effecting a result in accordance with the 
employer's des ign. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(5)(a) (1988) states: 
If any person who is an employer 
procures any work to be done wholly or in 
part for him by a contractor over whose work 
he retains supervision or control, and this 
work is a part or process in the trade of 
business of the employer, the contractor, all 
persons employed by him, all subcontractors 
under him, and all persons employed by any of 
these subcontractors, are considered 
employees of the original employer. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61: 
Harmless error. No error in either the 
admission or the exclusion of evidence, and 
no error or defect in any ruling or order or 
in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting 
a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take 
such action appears to the court inconsistent 
with substantial justice. The court at every 
stage of the proceeding must disregard any 
error or defect in the proceeding which does 
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not affect the substantial rights of the 
parties. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
The following portions of appellant's Statement of Case 
are disputed and explanations are presented in opposition or 
clarification thereto. 
1. In the third paragraph of appellant's Statement of 
Case, appellant claims that it acted as an agent and employee of 
the State in the performance of its duties under the project. 
The Engineer's Agreement (Trial Exhibit 31) stated that appellant 
as engineer would act as agent for the State, for limited and 
specific phases in the bidding process and in other supervisory 
capacities during construction, but said contract never 
designated appellant as a general agent or an employee. 
Appellant should not under any circumstance be considered an 
employee of the State. Furthermore, the only control or 
direction that the State exercised over appellant was in 
effecting a result in accordance with the State's goals. The 
Engineer's Agreement (Trial Exhibit 31) specifically established 
that the appellant was an independent contractor und€*r Article 
XVII. 
2. Page 4 of Appellant's Brief, in the second full 
paragraph, inaccurately describes Article 22 as the 
indemnification clause of the General Conditions and 
Specifications (Trial Exhibit 1). Said paragraph should be 
identified properly as paragraph 28. 
3. Furthermore, the last paragraph on page 4 of 
Appellant's Brief contains an improper legal argument that 
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appellant is an agent and employee of the State of Utah entitled 
to the protection and benefits of indemnification under the 
subject contracts. The clear language of the indemnification 
clauses of Trial Exhibit 4 and Trial Exhibit 1 clearly exclude 
appellant from the benefits thereof, as more fully set forth in 
the arguments hereafter. 
4. Lastly, the first paragraph on page 5 of 
Appellant's Brief improperly states that the court denied 
appellant's claim for contractual indemnity on the basis that 
"the appellant was not an 'agent of the State' for the purposes 
of governmental immunity." The court did not refer to 
governmental immunity, but merely referred to the fact that the 
State was immune as an employer under worker's compensation law. 
The court ruled that appellant was an independent contractor for 
purposes of its claims for contractual indemnification. (Trial 
Record 98, lines 18-25.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The clear and unequivocal interpretation of the 
indemnification provisions found in the General Conditions and 
Specifications (Trial Exhibit 1) and the Contract between the 
State of Utah and appellees (Trial Exhibit 4) limits 
indemnification to the State and its agencies, departments, and 
their employees, as defined in the contracts, and not appellant. 
2. The provisions of the General Conditions and 
Specifications (Trial Exhibit 1, paragraph 28) further limits 
appellees obligations of indemnification to claims based on 
violations of any federal, state or local law, statute or 
3 
ordinance. The claims of plaintiff were merely for negligence, 
not for violation of such laws, statutes or ordinances. 
Therefore, appellant has no right to indemnification. 
3. Appellant was an independemt contractor and cannot 
be considered an employee of the State. Accordingly, appellant 
is not entitled to any indemnification from appellees. 
4. Even if, arguendo, the trial court should have 
found appellant to be an agent of the State, such error is 
harmless since the outcome would not have been affected. The 
Contract unequivocally denies indemnification to agents or 
alleged agents of the State. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THE GENERAL RULES OF CONSTRUCTION OF 
CONTRACTS REQUIRE THE COURT TO GIVE THE 
CONTRACT LANGUAGE ITS PLAIN AND ORDINARY 
MEANING. 
The well established rules of contractual interpre-
tation in Utah require that an objective and a reasonable 
construction be given to the contract as a whole. G.G.A., Inc. 
v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1989); See also Utah 
State Med. Association v. Utah State Employees Credit Union, 655 
P.2d 643, 646 (Utah 1982); Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 
1007-08 (Utah 1982). "The cardinal rule in construing any 
contract must be to give effect to the intentions of the 
parties." Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 
(Utah 1987). These intentions must be determined, if possibler 
from an examination of the agreements themselves. Xd. A 
contract's interpretation is a question of law. Furthermore, the 
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question of whether a contract is ambiguous is also a question of 
law. Village Inn Apartments v. State Farm and Casualty Co,, 790 
P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1990). If a contract is determined to 
be ambiguous, even the interpretation of that contract is a 
question of law. Id. However, a contract is not ambiguous 
merely because a party might assign a different meaning to a 
particular phrase or term in accordance with that party's 
interests. Id. at 583 (citing Camp v. Deseret Mut. Benefit 
AssJLn, 589 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1979)). Finally, the fundamental 
rules of contract interpretation prohibit the court from adding, 
ignoring or discarding words in a contract; rather, the court 
should arrive at an interpretation of the contract by giving an 
objective and reasonable construction of the contract as a whole. 
Cornwall v. Willowcreek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P.2d 
928, 929 (Utah 1962). 
POINT II 
THE INDEMNITY PROVISIONS OF THE CONTRACTS DO 
NOT BENEFIT OR INCLUDE APPELLANT. 
In the recent decision of Pickover v. Smith's 
Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 1989), this Court 
confirmed the established rule that indemnity agreements are 
subject to strict construction. When a party is contractually 
obligated to assume the financial responsibility for the 
negligence of another, the indemnity provisions will be enforced 
"only when that intention is clearly and unequivocally 
expressed." Id. at 665 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Co., 408 P.2d 910, 914 (Utah 1965)). The Court 
reiterated the presumption against the shifting of ultimate 
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financial responsibility through indemnity clauses. Indemnity 
obligations will not be inferred or implied from general 
language. Xd. See also Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal 
Drilling Co., 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983). 
Appellant is basing its claim for indemnification 
against appellees on the language contained in the General 
Conditions and Specifications (Trial Exhibit 1), parcLgraph 28, 
entitled "Indemnification," as quoted in Appellant's Brief at 
11. An accurate reading of said paragraph 28 reveals that the 
persons or entities entitled to indemnification are the 
"indemnities" [sic] as defined in said paragraph. According to 
paragraph 28, "indemnities" are limited to the following: 
the State of Utah and all institutions, 
agencies, departments, authorities, and 
instrumentalities of the State of Utah, and 
any member of their governing bodies, or of 
their boards or commissions, or any of their 
elected or appointed officers, or any of 
their employees or authorized volunteers. 
The indemnification provisions do not require 
appellees, as contractor, to indemnify anyone other than those 
"indemnities" listed above. Even entities deemed to be agents of 
those indemnities are not included by the plain language of the* 
contract. In fact, by distilling the essential elements of the 
indemnification from its text, the clear construction and intent 
of the indemnification clause is revealed as follows: 
The contractor will . . . indemnify . . . 
indemnities from every kind and character of: 
damages, losses, expenses, demands, claims 
and causes of action arising against 
indemnities and their . . . agents, 
employees, or any other person . . . from, 
against or on account of any . . . claims, 
damages, losses, demands . . . arising out of 
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or resulting from any violation or alleged 
violation by contractor . . . of any federal, 
state or local law, statute or ordinance, 
relating to the work to be performed by the 
contractor on the project growing out of or 
incident to the work to be performed . . . by 
contractor . . . under this agreement, 
whether such claims . . . result from . . . 
the negligence of contractor . . . or whether 
resulting from . . . the concurrent 
negligence of indemnities and/or their . . . 
agents or employees. 
As illustrated from the preceding essential language 
of the indemnification, appellees are only required to indemnify 
the defined "indemnities," which term does not include agents of 
the State of Utah. An action against an agent of the State can 
give rise to appellee's obligation to indemnify, but the 
indemnification obligation extends only to the State, and not 
their agents, since the agents are not listed as indemnitees. 
The same indemnification language is reiterated in 
Article 11 of the Contract entered into between the State of Utah 
and appellees. (Trial Exhibit 4.) Said paragraph reads as 
follows: 
The Contractor agrees that it/he shall at 
all times protect and indemnify and save 
harmless, the State of Utah and all 
institutions, agencies, departments, 
authorities and instrumentalities of the 
State of Utah and any member of their 
governing bodies or of their boards of 
commissions or any of their elected or 
appointed officers or any of their employees 
or authorized volunteers as described in the 
general conditions of the project 
specifications which are included herein by 
reference, from any and all claims, damages 
of every kind and nature made, rendered or 
incurred by or in behalf of any person or 
corporation whatsoever, including the parties 
hereto and their employees that may arise, 
occur or grow out of any acts, actions, work 
or other activity done by the said contractor 
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in the performance and execution of this 
contract. 
A second and equally impelling reason for the rejection 
of appellant's appeal is found in the language of the 
indemnification itself. Appellees agreed to indemnify only the 
"indemnities" for any action "arising out of or resulting from 
any violation or alleged violation by contractor . . . of any 
federal, state or local law, statute or ordinance relating to the 
work . . • •" (See Trial Exhibit 1, paragraph 28) (emphasis 
added). The allegations of the Complaint brought by David 
Gordonf the plaintiff in the underlying case, were based solely 
upon negligence. There was no contractual obligation, cause of 
action or evidence made or presented at trial that claimed as 
its basis the violation of any federal, state or local statute or 
ordinance relating to the work. 
For the reasons set forth above, the clear and 
unequivocal language of the indemnification precludes any claim 
by appellant for contractual indemnification against appellees. 
The terms of the applicable indemnity provisions of the contracts 
apply only to the State and its agencies, as defined in the 
contracts. It does not apply to any agents1 in the position of 
appellant. 
1
 This assumes merely for the sake of argument, that 
appellant may have been an agent. Appellees assert that 
insufficient evidence was introduced at trial or in appellant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment to support the general cillegation 
that appellant was an agent of the State. As demonstrated above, 
however, it is irrelevant whether appellant was an agent since 
the contracts afford no indemnification to agents. 
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POINT III 
APPELLANT IS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF THE STATE. 
Appellees submit that they have established in the 
above arguments an adequate basis for this Court to affirm the 
trial court's rejection of appellant's claims for 
indemnification. Furthermore, appellant is unable to establish 
a right of indemnification by failing to prove its status as an 
employee of the State of Utah. Using only self-serving 
rhetoric, appellant argues that it is a "statutory employer" of 
the State of Utah within the definition of the Utah Worker's 
Compensation Act. The definition of "statutory employer" is only 
applicable and is confined to cases brought under the Worker's 
Compensation Act. Because of the unique system of compensation 
and liability devised by the legislature to govern the 
relationship of injured workers and employers in Utah, specific 
and unique definitions have been derived to carry out those 
goals. The case on appeal did not arise under the provisions of 
the Utah Worker's Compensation Act. Even if, arguendo, appellant 
were able to inject the Utah Worker's Compensation Act's 
definition of employee into this case, appellant entirely fails 
in its proof that the State retained supervision or control over 
appellant as required by Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(5)(a) (1988). 
To the contrary, the Engineer's Agreement clearly sets forth in 
Article XVII that the engineer "will be considered an independent 
contractor." (See Trial Exhibit 31.) Appellant and the State 
entered into the Engineer's Agreement as an arms-length contract 
wherein the appellant, as engineer, agreed to perform independent 
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engineer's services as specified in the contract, independent of 
the State as to aspects pertaining to the execution of the work, 
and without being subject to the rule or control of the State, 
except in achieving and effecting the result contemplated by the 
contract: the design, bidding and supervision of the 
construction of the storm drain facilities at the State Training 
School in American Fork. 
"Independent contractor" is defined by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-42(2)(b) (1988) as follows: 
[A]ny person engaged in the performance of 
any work for another who, while so engaged, 
is independent of the employer in all that 
pertains to the execution of the work, is not 
subject to the rule or control of the 
employer, is engaged only in the performance 
of a definite job or piece of work, and is 
subordinate to the employer only in effecting 
a result in accordance with the employer's 
design. 
Within the context of worker's compensation issues, it is 
important to determine who may or may not be an employer, an 
employee or an independent contractor, for the limited purposes 
of assessing liability for compensation or immunity from third-
party claims. However, these definitions cannot be used to 
bolster appellant's claim for indemnification. 
The concept of statutory employer or employee has been 
essentially eviscerated by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Pate v. Marathon Steel Company, 777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989). The 
Court clearly held that only an employer who actually pays 
compensation to an injured employee under the Worker's 
Compensation Act, and that employer's officers, agent and 
employees, are shielded by the exclusive remedy immunity provided 
10 
by § 35-1-60 Utah Code Annotated (1988). Id. at 431. Obviously, 
appellant is not attempting to assert the exclusive remedy 
immunity under § 35-1-60. Therefore, any attempts to apply the 
definition of employee under the Worker's Compensation Act for 
purposes of establishing a right to indemnification against 
appellees are unwarranted and should be denied. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE RULING OF THE 
TRIAL COURT IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTIONS TO 
ALLOW CLAIMS OF CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY. 
Although appellant accuses the trial court of confusing 
the concepts of immunity and indemnity, it is apparent that the 
appellant in fact has incorrectly interpreted the rulings of the 
court. Appellant claims that it previously had filed a Motion 
for Summary Judgment seeking a determination that it was entitled 
to protection of "governmental immunity under the Worker's 
Compensation Act." (Appellant's Brief at 15.) Again, appellant 
claims that the trial court denied appellant's attempts at trial 
to present evidence relating to contractual indemnity "because 
for purposes of governmental immunity appellant was not an agent 
of the State and to be consistent in the proceedings the court 
could not for purposes of indemnity prove that the appellant was 
an agent of the State." (Id.) The issue of governmental 
immunity was never raised, argued or used as a basis for any of 
the court's rulings. Appellant attempted to obtain dismissal by 
its Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing its status as a 
"statutory employer" under the Worker's Compensation Act for 
which immunity, if proper, would have obtained in the action by a 
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third party, David Gordon. The court properly denied appellant's 
motion on the basis of Pate v. Marathon. (See Exhibit "B" to 
Appellant's Brief.) 
Likewise, the trial court denied appellant's claim for 
contractual indemnity in its post-trial decision on September 27, 
1989. It reasoned that appellant did not stand in any employer-
employee relationship with the State consistent with its previous 
ruling denying the Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Exhibit "C" 
attached to Appellant's Brief.) 
Even if this Court were to find that Judge Ballif 
should have found appellant to be an agent of the State, such 
error would be harmless. Harmless errors are those which are so 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
error affects the outcome of the case. State v. Verdes, 770 P.2d 
116, 120 (Utah 1989). Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure states that no error in admission or exclusion of 
evidence or in any ruling is ground for disturbing a judgment 
"unless refusal to take such action appears to the court 
inconsistent with substantial justice." Id. 
Notwithstanding the reasons given by Judge Ballif for 
denial of appellant's claim for contractual indemnity, and 
appellant's attempts to present those claims to the jury, the 
trial court's rulings should be affirmed since the language of 
the contract unequivocally precludes appellant as an indemnitee, 
even if it were to be considered an agent of the State. 
12 
CONCLUSION 
The unambiguous and clear language of the 
indemnification clauses specifically limits any obligation of 
indemnification by appellees to the State of Utah, its 
institutions, agencies, departments, authorities and 
instrumentalities, members of their governing board, their boards 
or commissions or any of their elected or appointed officers or 
any of their employees or authorized volunteers. Appellant, 
working as an independent contractor under the Engineer's 
Agreement, does not qualify as a named indemnitee under the 
contracts, and therefore, is not entitled to any rights of 
indemnification. Furthermore, appellant's attempts to establish 
status as a State employee under the Worker's Compensation Act is 
without authority and should be denied by this Court, because of 
the unassailable construction of the indemnification clauses of 
the contracts. Utah rules requiring strict construction of 
indemnification clauses preclude any claim for indemnification by 
appellant. 
Appellees respectfully prays that this Court affirm 
the trial court's denial of appellant's claim for contractual 
indemnification and that appellant's request for remand to the 
trial court for a determination of the damages, attorney's fees 
and costs be denied. 
13 
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